Dodis and Wichs [DW09] introduced the notion of a non-malleable extractor to study the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary. A non-malleable extractor is a much stronger version of a strong extractor. Given a weakly-random string x and a uniformly random seed y as the inputs, the non-malleable extractor nmExt has the property that nmExt(x, y) appears uniform even given y as well as nmExt(x, A(y)), for an arbitrary function A with A(y) = y. Dodis and Wichs showed that such an object can be used to give optimal privacy amplification protocols with an active adversary.
Introduction
Seeded randomness extractors as defined by Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96] is an object that has been studied extensively in computer science. Besides its original motivation in computing with imperfect random sources, seeded extractors have found applications in coding theory, cryptography, complexity and many other areas. We refer the reader to [FS02, Vad02] for a survey on this subject. Especially, seeded extractors have been used in cryptography to give protocols that are leakage resilient. Recently, a new kind of seeded extractors, called non-malleable extractors were introduced in [DW09] to give protocols for the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary. We now give the definition of a non-malleable extractor below. As a comparison, we also give the definition of a strong extractor.
Notation. We let [s] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , s}. For ℓ a positive integer, U ℓ denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1} ℓ , and for S a set, U S denotes the uniform distribution on S. When used as a component in a vector, each U ℓ or U S is assumed independent of the other components. We say W ≈ ε Z if the random variables W and Z have distributions which are ε-close in variation distance. For X ∈ {0, 1} n , we call X an (n, H ∞ (X))-source, and we say X has entropy rate H ∞ (X)/n. We say X is a flat source if it is the uniform distribution over some subset S ⊂ {0, 1} n . Theorem 1.4. There exist constants 0 < δ, γ < 1 such that for any n ∈ N, k = (1/2 − δ)n and any ǫ > 2 −γn , there exists an explicit (k, ǫ)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} with d = O(log n + log(1/ǫ)). Theorem 1.5. There exists a constant 0 < δ < 1 such that for any n ∈ N, k = (1/2 − δ)n, there exists an explicit (k, ǫ)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m with m = Ω(n) and ǫ = 2 −Ω(n) .
Our third result needs to use an affine extractor and an assumption from additive combinatorics, as used in [BSZ11] . Thus we first define affine extractors and state the assumption. Definition 1.6. An [n, m, ρ, ǫ] affine extractor is a deterministic function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m such that whenever X is the uniform distribution over some affine subspace over F n 2 with dimension ρn, we have that for every z ∈ {0, 1} m ,
Note that we bound the error by the ℓ ∞ norm instead of the traditional ℓ 1 norm, as in [BSZ11] . We will let λ denote the entropy loss rate, i.e., λ = 1 − m ρn . In this paper we will focus on [n, (1 − λ) 2 3 n, 2 3 , 2 −m ] affine extractors and ideally we would like λ to be as small as possible (e.g., close to 0). We note that it is straightforward to show by the probabilistic method that such extractors exist for any constant λ > 0. However the state of art constructions only achieve λ ≈ 3 4 . Now we define the duality measure of two sets as in [BSZ11] . The following conjecture is introduced in [BSZ11] and is shown in that paper to be implied by the well-known Polynomial Freiman-Ruzsa Conjecture in additive combinatorics. Conjecture 1.8. (Approximate Duality (ADC)) [BSZ11] For every pair of constants α, δ > 0 there exist a constant ζ > 0 and an integer r, both depending on α and δ such that the following holds for sufficiently large n. If A, B ⊆ F n 2 satisfy |A|, |B| ≥ 2 αn and µ ⊥ (A, B) ≥ 2 −ζn , then there exists a pair of subsets We now have the following theorems.
Theorem 1.9. Assume the ADC conjecture and that we have an explicit [n, m, 2 3 , 2 −m ] affine extractor with m = (1 − λ) 2 3 n, then there exists a constant 0 < γ < 1 such that for any n ∈ N, k = 3λ 1+2λ n and any ǫ > 2 −γn , there exists a semi-explicit (k, ǫ)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} with d = O(log n + log(1/ǫ)). Remark 1.11. In these two theorems, we use the term semi-explicit to mean that the construction may run in time 2 n . It is semi-explicit in the sense that the running time is polynomial in the length of the truth table of the extractor (note that an exhaustive search takes time 2 2 n ). If we have affine extractors with large output size so that λ → 0, then we can essentially achieve k = αn for any constant α > 0.
Remark 1.12. It is also shown in [BSZ11] that a weaker form of the ADC conjecture is true.
By plugging Theorem 1.5 into the protocol of Dodis and Wichs, we obtain a 2-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss for min-entropy k = (1/2 − δ)n. Theorem 1.13. There exist constants 0 < δ, γ < 1 such that for any n ∈ N and ǫ > 2 −γn , there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol for min-entropy k ≥ (1/2−δ)n with security parameter log(1/ǫ) and entropy loss O(log n + log(1/ǫ)), in the presence of an active adversary.
Note that this protocol is truly optimal in both round complexity and entropy loss, since [DW09] shows that there can be no one-round protocol for k < n/2. As a comparison, for k > n/2 we do have one-round protocols, although the entropy loss is quite large.
Overview of The Constructions and Techniques
In this section we give an overview of our constructions and the techniques used. In order to give a clean description, we shall be informal and imprecise sometimes.
All of our constructions are based on the inner product function. Especially, we are going to make extensive use of the fact that the inner product function is a bilinear function. Note that the inner product function is a good strong extractor. In fact, it is also a good two-source extractor. For two independent sources on n bits, it works as long as the sum of the entropies of the two sources is greater than n. However, at first this function does not seem to be a good candidate for a non-malleable extractor. To see this, consider the inner product function over F 2 . Let X be a source that is obtained by concatenating the bit 0 with U n−1 , and let Y be an independent uniform seed over {0, 1} n . Now for any y ∈ {0, 1} n , let A(y) be y with the first bit flipped. Thus we see that for all x in the support of X, one has x, y = x, A(y) . Therefore, the inner product function is not a non-malleable extractor even for weak sources with min-entropy k = n − 1.
Let IP denote the inner product function. In the above example, we have that for all x in the support of X, IP(x, y) = IP(x, A(y)). Or equivalently, IP(x, y) ⊕ IP(x, A(y)) = 0. Since IP is bilinear, this means that IP(x, y + A(y)) = 0. How does this happen? Looking closely at this example, our key observation is that this is because the range of Y is too large. Indeed, in this example the range of Y is the entire {0, 1} n , thus for any y the adversary can choose a different A(y) such that y + A(y) = 10 · · · 0 so that ∀x ∈ Supp(X), IP(x, y + A(y)) = 0.
This observation suggests that we should choose the range of Y to be a small subset S ⊂ {0, 1} n , so that for some y's, the adversary will be unable to choose the appropriate A(y) from S. In other words, we take a shorter seed length l, choose an independent and uniform y ∈ {0, 1} l and map y to an element in {0, 1} n . This mapping is essentially an encoding. Now let us see what properties we need the encoding to have.
We will start with a construction that works for min-entropy k > n/2. Assume that we have a weak source X with min-entropy k = (1/2 + δ)n for some constant δ > 0. We take an independent and uniform y ∈ {0, 1} l and encode y toȳ ∈ {0, 1} n . For any adversarial function A, letȳ ′ be the encoding of A(y). We will use an injective encoding, so that ∀y,ȳ ′ =ȳ. The output of the non-malleable extractor is then IP(X,Ȳ ).
To show that IP(X,Ȳ ) is a non-malleable extractor, it suffices to show that IP(X,Ȳ ) is close to uniform, and that IP(X,Ȳ ) ⊕ IP(X,Ȳ ′ ) is close to uniform. The first part is easy. If X has min-entropy k > n/2, then we can take Y to be the uniform distribution over some l ≥ n/2 bits. Since the encoding is injective,Ȳ will have min-entropy l ≥ n/2. Thus IP(X,Ȳ ) is close to uniform. For the second part, note that IP(X,Ȳ ) ⊕ IP(X,Ȳ ′ ) = IP(X,Ȳ +Ȳ ′ ). Thus now we needȲ +Ȳ ′ to have a large min-entropy. Indeed, in the above counterexample where l = n, the adversary can choose A such thatȲ +Ȳ ′ is always equal to 10 · · · 0 and thus has entropy 0. Now when we take l < n and map {0, 1} l to S ⊂ {0, 1} n , we wantȲ +Ȳ ′ to have a large support size.
The ideal case would be thatȲ +Ȳ ′ also has support size |S| = 2 l . This can be achieved if the encoding has the following property: for every two different y 1 , y 2 , we have thatȳ 1 +ȳ ′ 1 =ȳ 2 +ȳ ′ 2 , or equivalently,ȳ 1 +ȳ ′ 1 +ȳ 2 +ȳ ′ 2 = 0. Indeed, if this is true thenȲ +Ȳ ′ also has min-entropy l ≥ n/2, and thus IP(X,Ȳ ) ⊕ IP(X,Ȳ ′ ) is close to uniform. Looking carefully at this property, we see that it can be ensured (at least almost ensured, as we will explain shortly) if we have another property: the elements in S (when viewed as vectors in F n 2 ) are 4-wise linearly independent. Indeed, assume that the elements in S are 4-wise linearly independent. Then ifȳ 1 +ȳ ′ 1 +ȳ 2 +ȳ ′ 2 = 0, the only possible situation is thatȳ ′ 1 =ȳ 2 andȳ ′ 2 =ȳ 1 . Thus there cannot be three different y 1 , y 2 , y 3 such thatȳ 1 +ȳ ′ 1 =ȳ 2 +ȳ ′ 2 =ȳ 3 +ȳ ′ 3 . Thus the min-entropy ofȲ +Ȳ ′ is at least l − 1. So now the question is to explicitly find a large subset S ⊂ {0, 1} n such that the elements in S are 4-wise linearly independent. Note that in particular this implies that the sum of any two different pairs of elements in S cannot be the same. Thus we have |S| 2 ≤ 2 n . Therefore |S| can be at most roughly 2 n/2 . On the other hand, in order to work for any min-entropy k > n/2, we will need l ≥ n/2 and thus |S| = 2 l ≥ 2 n/2 . These are very tight upper and lower bounds. Luckily, we have explicit constructions that meet these bounds. We will think of the elements in S as columns in a parity check matrix of some binary linear code. Thus we basically need a code with block length 2 n/2 and message length 2 n/2 − n. The 4-wise linearly independent property basically is equivalent to saying that the code has distance at least 5. This is precisely the [2 n/2 , 2 n/2 − n, 5]-BCH code. Note that although the parity check matrix has 2 n/2 columns, each column is (a, a 3 ) for a different element a ∈ F * 2 n/2 . Thus the encoding from y toȳ can be computed efficiently. Once we have the encoding, we can choose l = n/2 and we know thatȲ has min-entropy l andȲ +Ȳ ′ has min-entropy l − 1. Now it is straightforward to show that both IP(X,Ȳ ) and IP(X,Ȳ +Ȳ ′ ) are close to uniform. Thus we obtain a non-malleable extractor that works for min-entropy k > n/2.
Achieving min-entropy k < n/2
Next we show how we can improve the above construction to achieve min-entropy k < n/2. To this end, we borrow ideas from [Bou05] , where the first and the only known unconditional explicit constructions of two source extractors for min-entropy k < n/2 were given. Specifically, let X be a distribution over some vector space F n q and let cX be the distribution obtained by sampling x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x c from c independent copies of X and computing x i . By Fourier analysis and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality one can show that in order to prove IP(X, Y ) is close to uniform, it suffices to prove that IP(cX, Y ) is close to uniform with a smaller error, for some integer c > 1. In [Bou05] , Bourgain showed that for a weak source X with min-entropy rate 1/2 − δ for some constant δ > 0, one can encode X to Enc(X) such that 3Enc(X) is close to having min-entropy rate 1/2 + δ. He then used this encoding together with the inner product function to construct a two source extractor that works for min-entropy rate 1/2 − δ.
Here we want to do the same thing. When given a source X with min-entropy rate 1/2 − δ, we encode X using Bourgain's encoding, and we encode the seed Y using the parity check matrix we discussed before. The non-malleable extractor is given as nmExt(X, Y ) = IP(Enc(X),Ȳ ). Thus we see that 3Enc(X) is close to having min-entropy rate 1/2 + δ, and bothȲ andȲ +Ȳ ′ have min-entropy rate roughly 1/2. Therefore both IP(3Enc(X),Ȳ ) and IP(3Enc(X),Ȳ +Ȳ ′ ) are close to uniform. We thus conclude that both IP(Enc(X),Ȳ ) and IP(Enc(X),Ȳ +Ȳ ′ ) are close to uniform, and we obtain a non-malleable extractor with 1 bit output for min-entropy k = (1/2 − δ)n.
To give our first construction that outputs Ω(n) bits, we use a different encoding for Y . In this case our construction is essentially Bourgain's two-source extractor. Given an (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2 − δ)n, we treat X as an element in the field F p , for an n + 1-bit prime p. We next take a uniform independent seed Y ∈ {0, 1} n and also treat Y as an element in F p . We encode X to (X, X 2 ) and Y to (Y, Y 2 ), viewed as vectors in F 2 p . The non-malleable extractor is given as nmExt(X, Y ) = IP((X, X 2 ), (Y, Y 2 )) mod M for an appropriately chosen integer M , and the inner product is taken over F 2 p . Here the argument for the non-malleability is different. Since the output has multiple bits, we need to use a non-uniform XOR lemma. Specifically, we choose the characters e r (s) = e 2πirs/p . Let
, we need to show that for any non-trivial character e t and any character e t ′ , |E X,Y [e t (Z)e t ′ (Z ′ )]| is bounded. Simple calculations show that when t = 0, e t (Z)e t ′ (Z ′ ) = e t (Z ′′ ), where Z ′′ = IP((X, X 2 ), (Y + rY ′ , Y 2 + r(Y ′ ) 2 )) and r = t ′ /t. Thus it suffices to show that IP((X, X 2 ), (Y + rY ′ , Y 2 + r(Y ′ ) 2 )) is close to uniform.
As in [Bou05] , one can show that 3(X, X 2 ) is close to having min-entropy rate 1/2 + δ. If t ′ = 0 then r = 0 and (Y + rY ′ , Y 2 + r(Y ′ ) 2 )) = (Y, Y 2 ), which has min-entropy rate roughly 1/2. Thus IP((X, X 2 ), (Y + rY ′ , Y 2 + r(Y ′ ) 2 )) is close to uniform. If t ′ = 0 then r = 0 and we show that (Y + rY ′ , Y 2 + r(Y ′ ) 2 )) has roughly the same min-entropy as Y (at least the min-entropy of Y minus 1). Thus IP((X, X 2 ), (Y + rY ′ , Y 2 + r(Y ′ ) 2 )) is still close to uniform. We further show that the error is 2 −Ω(n) . Therefore by the non-uniform XOR lemma Lemma 3.4 we obtained a non-malleable extractor with Ω(n) bits of output.
Achieving any constant min-entropy rate
In [BSZ11] , Ben-Sasson and Zewi showed that affine extractors with large output size can be used to construct two source extractors with min-entropy rate < 1/2. Their "preimage construction" can potentially achieve any constant min-entropy rate. We show that their techniques combined with ours can also potentially lead to non-malleable extractors for any constant min-entropy rate. Specifically, they showed that if we have an affine extractor with large output size, then there is an injective mapping F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n ′ that maps {0, 1} n into the preimage of a certain output of the affine extractor, such that for any weak source X with a certain amount of minentropy, F (Supp(X)) is not contained in any affine subspace of dimension say 0.51n ′ . Thus, we can take an independent uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1} n ′ /2 and construct a non-malleable extractor nmExt(X, Y ) = IP(F (X),Ȳ ), whereȲ is encoded using the parity check matrix of a suitable BCH-code as before. Since bothȲ andȲ +Ȳ ′ have min-entropy roughly n ′ /2, we have that both IP(F (X),Ȳ ) and IP(F (X), (Ȳ +Ȳ ′ )) are non-constant. Next, similar as in [BSZ11] , we use the ADC conjecture to argue that in fact both IP(F (X),Ȳ ) and IP(F (X), (Ȳ +Ȳ ′ )) are close to uniform. Therefore we obtain a non-malleable extractor.
Reducing seed length
In all the constructions where we encode the seed Y by a parity check matrix, the seed length is linear in the source length. However the error is also 2 −Ω(n) . If we only need to achieve a bigger error, we can reduce the seed length by using the parity check matrix of a BCH code with larger distance. Specifically, when the distance is 2t + 1 the seed length is roughly n/t. However we need to guarantee something else. For example, in the construction for min-entropy k > n/2, we need to show that both IP(X,Ȳ ) and IP(X, (Ȳ +Ȳ ′ )) are still close to uniform. This can be shown as follows. Since now the columns of the parity check matrix are 2t-wise linearly independent, both t 2Ȳ and t 2 (Ȳ +Ȳ ′ ) will now have min-entropy roughly t 2 H ∞ (Y ) = n/2. Thus we can conclude that both IP(X, t 2Ȳ ) and IP(X, t 2 (Ȳ +Ȳ ′ )) are close to uniform, and therefore both IP(X,Ȳ ) and IP(X, (Ȳ +Ȳ ′ )) are also close to uniform, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. However the error increases according to the seed length. Calculations show that we can get seed length d = O(log n + log(1/ǫ)).
Increasing output size
We can also increase the output size to Ω(n) for all our constructions with 1 bit output. To do this, note that we encode the seed Y by using the columns of a parity check matrix of a BCH code. Equivalently, the encoding is thatȲ = (Y, Y 3 ) when we use a field F 2 l with l = Θ(n) and Y is viewed as an element in F * 2 l . Now treat F 2 l as the vector space F l 2 and we take l elements b 1 , · · · , b l ∈ F 2 l that corresponds to a basis of F l 2 . Now for each b i we define one bit Z i = IP(Enc(X), b iȲ ). We then show that {Z i } satisfy the conditions of a non-uniform XOR lemma, Lemma 3.3. Specifically, let
, by the linearity of the inner product function, the xor of Z i 's where i ∈ S 1 and Z ′ j 's where j ∈ S 2 is of the form IP(Enc(X), t 1Ȳ + t 2Ȳ ′ ), with t 1 , t 2 ∈ F 2 l . Since S 1 is non-empty we have t 1 = 0. We then show that t 1Ȳ + t 2Ȳ ′ roughly has the same min-entropy as Y (at least the min-entropy of Y minus log 3). Now since for example 3Enc(X) is close to having min-entropy rate 1/2 + δ, we conclude that IP(Enc(X), t 1Ȳ + t 2Ȳ ′ ) is close to uniform. We further show that the error is 2 −Ω(n) . Thus by Lemma 3.3 we can output m = Ω(n) bits with error 2 −Ω(n) .
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give some preliminaries in Section 3. Next, to illustrate our ideas, in Section 4 we give a construction of a non-malleable extractor for k > n/2, using the inner product function. In Section 5 we give non-malleable extractors for k = (1/2 − δ)n. In Section 6 we give non-malleable extractors that can potentially achieve any constant min-entropy rate. In Section 7 we briefly describe how we can reduce the seed length by using a BCH-code with larger distance, and how we can increase the output size for all constructions with one bit output. Finally in Section 8 we conclude with some open problems.
Preliminaries
We often use capital letters for random variables and corresponding small letters for their instantiations. Let |S| denote the cardinality of the set S. Let Z r denote the cyclic group Z/(rZ), and let F q denote the finite field of size q. All logarithms are to the base 2.
Probability distributions
Definition 3.1 (statistical distance). Let W and Z be two distributions on a set S. Their statistical distance (variation distance) is
For a distribution D on a set S and a function h : S → T , let h(D) denote the distribution on T induced by choosing x according to D and outputting h(x). We often view a distribution as a function whose value at a sample point is the probability of that sample point. Thus W − Z ℓ 1 denotes the ℓ 1 norm of the difference of the distributions specified by the random variables W and Z, which equals 2∆(W, Z).
m is a strong two source extractor for min-entropy k 1 , k 2 and error ǫ if for every independent (n 1 , k 1 ) source X and (n 2 , k 2 ) source Y ,
where U m is the uniform distribution on m bits independent of (X, Y ).
Fourier analysis
We give some basic and standard facts about Fourier analysis here. We normalize as in [DLWZ11] . For functions f, g from a set S to C, we define the inner product f, g = x∈S f (x)g(x). Let D be a distribution on S, sometimes we will also view it as a function from S to R. Note that
Let G be a finite abelian group, we say φ is a character of G if it is a homomorphism from G to C × . We call the character that maps all elements to 1 the trivial character. Define the Fourier coefficient f (φ) = f, φ , and let f denote the vector with entries f (φ) for all φ. Note that for a distribution D, one has
Since the characters divided by |G| form an orthonormal basis, the inner product is preserved up to scale: f , g = |G| f, g . As a corollary, we obtain Parseval's equality:
Hence by Cauchy-Schwarz,
(1)
For functions f, g : S → C, we define the function (f, g) :
. Thus, the characters of the group G × G are the functions (φ, φ ′ ), where φ and φ ′ range over all characters of G. We abbreviate the
In this paper, in the additive group of F p we use the characters e r (s) = e 2πirs/p for r ∈ F p . It is easy to verify that {e r , r ∈ F p } indeed are characters and these characters divided by √ p form an orthonormal basis. Note that the trivial character corresponds to the case r = 0. We next generalize the characters to the additive group of the field F p l . In this case, for any r ∈ F p l , we use the character e r (s) = e 2πi(r·s)/p , where r and s are viewed as vectors in F l p and · indicates the inner product function in F l p . Again it is easy to verify that these indeed are characters and they form an orthonormal basis (up to a normalization factor of p l/2 ).
Non-uniform XOR lemma
The following non-uniform XOR lemmas are proved in [DLWZ11] .
Lemma 3.3. Let (W, W ′ ) be a random variable on G × G for a finite abelian group G, and suppose that for all characters ψ, ψ ′ on G with ψ nontrivial, one has
Then the distribution of (W, W ′ ) is ǫ|G| close to (U, W ′ ), where U is the uniform distribution on G independent of W ′ . Moreover, for f :
Lemma 3.4. For every cyclic group G = Z N and every integer M ≤ N , there is an efficiently computable function σ : Z N → Z M = H such that the following holds. Let (W, W ′ ) be a random variable on G × G, and suppose that for all characters ψ, ψ ′ on G with ψ nontrivial, one has
where U stands for the uniform distribution over H independent of W ′ .
Strong non-malleable extractor
The following theorem is proved in [Rao07] .
Theorem 3.5.
[Rao07] Let TExt : {0, 1} n 1 × {0, 1} n 2 → {0, 1} m be any two source extractor for min-entropy k 1 , k 2 with error ǫ. Then if X is an (n 1 , k 1 ) source and Y is an independent (n 1 , k ′ 2 ) source, we have
Here we prove a similar theorem that will enable our non-malleable extractor to be "strong".
Theorem 3.6. Let TExt : {0, 1} n 1 × {0, 1} n 2 → {0, 1} m be a two source extractor for min-entropy k 1 , k 2 and A : {0, 1} n 2 → {0, 1} n 2 be a deterministic function such that for any (n 1 , k 1 ) source X and any independent (n 2 , k 2 ) source Y ,
Then we must have
To see this, assume for the sake of contradiction that
z,z ′ | and thus one of them must have size ≥ 2 k 2 . Without loss of generality assume that |B + z,z ′ | ≥ 2 k 2 . Then we can let Y to be the uniform distribution over |B
2 ) source, as follows.
Basic properties of the inner product function
Here we prove some basic properties of the inner product function.
Lemma 3.8. Let F p be a field and X, Y be two independent random variables over F l p . Assume that X has min-entropy k 1 and Y has min-entropy k 2 . Let Z = IP(X, Y ) = X · Y be the inner product function where the operation is in F p . For any non-trivial character e r where r ∈ F p ,
Proof. Note that if a weak random source W has min-entropy k, then W ℓ ∞ ≤ 2 −k , and
Therefore by Cauchy-Schwartz,
Now for any weak random source W , we let 2W = W + W stand for the distribution that is obtained by first sampling w 1 , w 2 from two independent and identical distributions according to W , and then computing w 1 + w 2 . Similarly W − W is obtained by first sampling w 1 , w 2 and then computing w 1 − w 2 . Similarly we define cW to be the distribution by sampling w i from c independent and identical distributions according to W , and then computing the sum. We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.9. Let X, Y be two independent random variables over F l p . For any two integers c 1 , c 2 ,
Proof. First note
Note that ψ(s) = e 2πirs/p for some r ∈ F p . Thus by Jensen's inequality,
where
Apply the above procedure again, we get that
Repeat the procedure for c 1 times, we get that
similarly, we can apply the argument to Y for another c 2 times, and we get
Thus the lemma is proved.
Incidence theorems
We need the following theorems about point line incidences. For a field F, we call a subset ℓ ⊂ F ×F a line if there exist a, b ∈ F such that ℓ = {(x, ax + b)} for all x ∈ F. Let P ⊂ F × F be a set of points and L be a set of lines, we say that a point (x, y) has an incidence with a line ℓ if (x, y) ∈ ℓ.
The following theorem provides a bound on the number of incidences that can be generated from K points and K lines.
Theorem 3.10. [BKT04, Kon03] There exist universal constants α > 0, 0.1 > β > 0 such that for any field F q where q is either prime or 2 p for p prime, if L, P are sets of K lines and K points respectively, with K ≤ q 2−β , the number of incidences I(P, L) ≤ O(K 3/2−α ).
BCH codes
In this paper we will only focus on BCH codes over F 2 . Given two parameters m, t ∈ N, a BCH code is a linear code with block length n = 2 m − 1, message length roughly n − mt and distance d ≥ 2t + 1. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.11. For all integers m and t there exists an explicit [n, n − mt, 2t + 1]-BCH code 3 , with n = 2 m − 1.
Since a BCH code is a linear code, we can take its parity check matrix. Note that this is a mt × n matrix. Let α be a primitive element in F * 2 m , the i'th column of the parity check matrix is of the form (α i , (α i ) 3 , (α i ) 5 , · · · , (α i ) 2t−1 ), for i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1. Since α is a generator in F * 2 m , equivalently, for y ∈ F * 2 m we can think of the y'th column to be (y, y 3 , · · · , y 2t−1 ).
4 A Non-Malleable Extractor for Entropy Rate > 1/2
As a warm up, in this section we construct a non-malleable extractor for weak sources with minentropy rate > 1/2, based on the inner product function over F 2 . To this end, we need to use the BCH code over F 2 . The construction is described as below.
Given an (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2 + δ)n, we choose a BCH code with t = 2 and m = n/2, thus the block length is n ′ = 2 n/2 − 1 and the parity check matrix is a n × (2 n/2 − 1) matrix.
Take an independent uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1} n/2−1 and let S Y stand for the integer whose binary expression is Y . We encode Y toȲ such thatȲ = Enc(Y ) is the S Y 'th column in the parity check matrix (i.e.,Ȳ = (Y, Y 3 ) when Y is viewed as an element in F * 2 n/2 ). Our non-malleable extractor is now defined as
where IP is the inner product function over F 2 and the output is just 1 bit.
To analyze our construction, we first have the following theorem.
We now show that the construction is a non-malleable extractor.
Theorem 4.2. For any constant δ > 0, the function nmExt defined as above is a ((1/2+δ)n, 2 −Ω(n) ) non-malleable extractor.
Proof. Let Z = nmExt(X, Y ) and Z ′ = nmExt(X, Y ′ ) where Y ′ = A(Y ) for any deterministic function A such that ∀y, A(y) = y. To show the construction is a non-malleable extractor, by the xor lemma it suffices to show that
for some ǫ = 2 −Ω(n) . Note that the BCH code has distance 2t + 1 = 5 > 4, thus any 4 columns in the parity check matrix must be linearly independent. This in particular implies that every two different columns must be different. ThusȲ has min-entropy n/2 − 1. Since k + n/2 − 1 = n + δn − 1, by Theorem 4.1 we have (note that there is a one to one correspondence betweenȲ and Y)
with ǫ 1 = 2 −Ω(n) . Thus we have that with probability 1 − √ ǫ 1 over the fixing of Y = y,
Next, note that
For
. Therefore, the min-entropy ofȲ +Ȳ ′ is at least n/2 − 2 since the probability of getting any particular element in the support is at most 2·2 −(n/2−1) = 2 −(n/2−2) . Since k +n/2−2 = n+δn−2, by Theorem 4.1 we have
with ǫ 2 = 2 −Ω(n) . This means that with probability 1 − √ ǫ 2 over the fixing ofȲ +Ȳ ′ , Z ⊕ Z ′ is √ ǫ 2 -close to uniform. SinceȲ +Ȳ ′ is a deterministic function of Y , this implies that with probability 1 − √ ǫ 2 over the fixing of Y = y,
Thus by the non-uniform xor lemma, Lemma 3.3, we have that with probability 1 − √ ǫ 1 − √ ǫ 2 over the fixing of Y = y,
Therefore we have that
5 Non-Malleable Extractors for Entropy Rate < 1/2
In this section we give our main constructions, namely non-malleable extractors for weak sources with min-entropy rate 1/2 − δ for some universal constant δ > 0. We give two constructions, one that outputs one bit and one that outputs many bits.
A non-malleable extractor with 1 bit output
Given an (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2 − δ)n, we first pick a prime p that is close to n. By Bertrand's postulate and Pierre Dusart's improvement, for every n ≥ 3275, there exists a prime between n and n(1 + 1 2 ln 2 n ). We will pick a prime p in this range. Note that the prime can be found in polynomial time in n. Take the field F q where q = 2 p and let g be a generator in F * q . The construction is as follows.
• Treat X as an element in F * q and encode X such that Enc(X) = (X, g X ).
• Take the parity check matrix of a [2 p − 1, 2 p − 1 − 2p, 5]-BCH code (note that the parity check matrix is a 2p × (2 p − 1) matrix). Take an independent and uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1} p−1 and let S Y stand for the integer whose binary expression is Y . We encode Y toȲ such thatȲ is the S Y 'th column in the parity check matrix (i.e.,Ȳ = (Y, Y 3 ) when Y is viewed as an element in F * 2 p ).
• Output nmExt(X, Y ) = IP(Enc(X),Ȳ ) where IP is the inner product function over F 2 .
To prove our construction is a non-malleable extractor, we are going to use the non-uniform XOR lemma. Specifically, we will first prove that nmExt(X, Y ) ≈ U and nmExt(X, Y )⊕nmExt(X, A(Y )) ≈ U , for any function A such that ∀y ∈ {0, 1} p−1 , A(y) = y.
To this end, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. There exists a constant δ > 0 such that for any (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2 − δ)n, and any independent (2p, k 2 ) source Y with k 2 ≥ (1 − δ)p,
where ǫ = 2 −Ω(n) .
Proof. We think of X as a distribution in F * q that has min-entropy k. This increases the error by at most 2 −k (for the element 0). By the XOR lemma, we only need to show that for the only non-trivial character ψ (since we only output 1 bit),
Let X ′ = 4Enc(X) − 4Enc(X), by Lemma 3.9 we have
First we show that X ′ is close to a source with min-entropy rate > 1/2. We have the following claim.
Claim 5.2. There is a universal constant δ > 0 such that if X is any weak source with min-entropy (1/2 − δ)n, 3Enc(X) is 2 −Ω(n) -close to a source with min-entropy (1/2 + δ)(2p).
Proof of the claim. Note that k = (1/2 − δ)n and p is between n and n(1 + 1 2 ln 2 n ). Thus for sufficiently large n we have that k ≥ (1/2 − 1.01δ)p. Note that we choose the field F q where q = 2 p . Thus the sum of Enc(X) + Enc(X) when viewing Enc(X) as a vector in F 2p 2 is the same as when viewing Enc(X) as a vector in F 2 q . In the following we will view Enc(X) as a vector in F 2 q . We show that 3Enc(X) has a larger min-entropy rate.
First consider the distribution 2Enc(X). Note that the distribution is of the form (X + X, g X + g X ). LetX = g X and note that g x is a bijection in F * q . ThusX has the same min-entropy as X. Now the support of 2Enc(X) is of the form (log g (x 1x2 ),x 1 +x 2 ). For any (b, a) in this support, we have thatx 1x2 = g b andx 1 +x 2 = a. Thus there are at most 2 different pairs of (x 1 ,x 2 ) that satisfy both equations. Therefore the min-entropy of 2Enc(X) is at least 2H ∞ (X) − 1. We can also assume that a = 0 since this only increases the error by at most 2 −H∞(X) . Now let k = H ∞ (X) − 1, we have that Enc(X) has min-entropy at least k and 2Enc(X) has min-entropy at least 2k. Now consider 3Enc(X). Every element in the support of 3Enc(X) has the form (log g (x 1x2x3 ),x 1 + x 2 +x 3 ), which determines the point (x 1x2x3 ,x 1 +x 2 +x 3 ). Let a =x 1 +x 2 and b =x 1x2 , this point is (bx 3 , a +x 3 ).
Letx 3 = a +x 3 , then (a +x 3 , bx 3 ) = (x 3 , bx 3 − ab).
For a fixed (a =x 1 +x 2 , b =x 1x2 ) define the line
Thus we have a set of lines L = {ℓ a,b }. Note that a = 0 and b = 0. Thus for different (a, b) , the line ℓ a,b is also different. Note that x 3 is sampled from X 3 , which has min-entropy k and (a, b) is sampled from Enc(X 1 ) + Enc(X 2 ), which has min-entropy 2k. Further note that these two distributions are independent. Since every weak source with min-entropy k is a convex combination of flat k sources, without loss of generality we can assume that X 3 and Enc(X 1 ) + Enc(X 2 ) are both flat sources. Thus L has size 2 2k . Now let α, β be the two constants in Theorem 3.10. Assume that 3Enc(X) is ǫ-far from any source with min-entropy (1 + α/2)2k. Since 3Enc(X) determines the distribution (A +X 3 , BX 3 ), this distribution is also ǫ-far from any source with min-entropy (1 + α/2)2k. Thus there must exist some set M of size at most 2 (1+α/2)2k such that
Note that whenever (a +x 3 , bx 3 ) ∈ M , this point has an incidence with the line ℓ a,b . Further note that whenever (a, b) is different or x 3 is different, the incidence is also different. Thus by the above inequality the number of incidences between the set of points M and the set of lines L is at least
On the other hand, since L has size 2 2k and M has size 2 (1+α/2)2k ≤ 2 (1+α/2)2(1/2−δ)p < 2 (1+α/2)p ≤ q 2−β , by Theorem 3.10, the number of incidences between M and L is at most O(2 (3/2−α)(2+α)k ) < 2 3k(1−α/6) = 2 −αk/2 2 3k .
Thus we must have ǫ < 2 −αk/2 . Thus we have shown that 3Enc(X) is 2 −αk/2 -close to having min-entropy (1 + α/2)2k. By choosing δ appropriately, we get that 3Enc(X) is 2 −Ω(n) -close to having min-entropy (1/2+δ)2p. Now note that Y is a weak source over {0, 1} 2p with min-entropy k 2 ≥ (1 − δ)p. Also note that the min-entropy of X ′ is at least the min-entropy of 3Enc(X). Thus by Lemma 3.8 we have that
Now we can prove our construction is a non-malleable extractor.
Theorem 5.3. For any (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2 − δ)n, an independent seed Y and any deterministic function A such that ∀y ∈ {0, 1} p−1 , A(y) = y,
Proof. First let Y ′ be an independent source over {0, 1} p−1 with min-entropy k 2 ≥ (1 − δ)p + 1. Since the columns of the parity check matrix of the BCH code are 4-wise linearly independent, different y will be mapped to differentȳ. ThusȲ ′ also has min-entropy k 2 ≥ (1 − δ)p + 1. By Lemma 5.1 we have
. By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.2,Ȳ ′ +Ā(Y ′ ) has min-entropy at least k 2 − 1 ≥ (1 − δ)p. Thus again by Lemma 5.1 we have
Thus by the non-uniform XOR lemma, Lemma 3.3, we have
Now note that Y has min-entropy p − 1, thus by Theorem 3.6,
A non-malleable extractor with multiple bits output
Given an (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2 − δ)n, we first pick a prime p such that 2 n < p < 2 n+1 . By Bertrand's postulate, there is always such a prime. Now treat X as an element in the field F p . Next we take an independent and uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1} n and again treat Y as an element in F p . Encode X, Y such that Enc(X) = (X, X 2 ) and Enc(Y ) = (Y, Y 2 ). The operations are in F p . Our non-malleable extractor is defined as
for some integer M = 2 m that we will choose later. Note that Enc(X) and Enc(Y ) are vectors in F 2 p and IP is the inner product function taken over F p . Again, we show that for any weak source X with min-entropy (1/2 − δ)n, 3Enc(X) is close to a weak source that has min-entropy (1/2 + δ) log(p 2 ).
Lemma 5.4. Let F = F p for p prime and X be a random variable over F. There is a universal constant δ > 0 such that if X is any weak source with min-entropy (1/2 − δ)n, 3Enc(X) is p −Ω(1) -close to a source with min-entropy (1/2 + δ) log(p 2 ).
Proof. Note that X has min-entropy (1/2 − δ)n > (1/2 − δ) log p − 1. First consider the distribution 2Enc(X). Note that the distribution is of the form (X + X, X 2 + X 2 ). For any (a, b) in the support of 2Enc(X), we have that a = x 1 + x 2 and b = x 2 1 + x 2 2 . Thus there are at most 2 different pairs of (x 1 , x 2 ) that satisfy both equations. Therefore the min-entropy of 2Enc(X) is at least 2H ∞ (X) − 1. Now let k = H ∞ (X) − 1, we have that Enc(X) has min-entropy at least k and 2Enc(X) has min-entropy at least 2k. We now have the following claim.
Claim 5.5. Let α, β be the two constants in Theorem 3.10. Then 3Enc(X) is 2 −Ω(k) -close to a source with min-entropy (1 + α/2)2k.
Proof of the claim. Note that an element in the support of 3Enc(X) has the form (x 1 +x 2 +x 3 , x 2 1 + x 2 2 + x 2 3 ). This determines the point
Let a = x 1 + x 2 and b = x 2 1 + x 2 2 , this point is (a + x 3 , 2ax 3 + a 2 − b).
For a fixed (a = x 1 + x 2 , b = x 2 1 + x 2 2 ) define the line
Note that for different (a, b), the line ℓ a,b is also different. Thus we have a set of lines L = {ℓ a,b }. Note that x 3 is sampled from X 3 , which has min-entropy k and (a, b) is sampled from Enc(X 1 ) + Enc(X 2 ), which has min-entropy 2k. Further note that these two distributions are independent. Since every weak source with min-entropy k is a convex combination of flat k sources, without loss of generality we can assume that X 3 and Enc(X 1 ) + Enc(X 2 ) are both flat sources. Thus L has size 2 2k . Now assume that 3Enc(X) is ǫ-far from any source with min-entropy (1+α/2)2k. Since 3Enc(X) determines the distribution (A + X 3 , 2AX 3 + A 2 − B), this distribution is also ǫ-far from any source with min-entropy (1 + α/2)2k. Thus there must exist some set M of size at most 2 (1+α/2)2k such that
Note that whenever (a + x 3 , 2ax 3 + a 2 − b) ∈ M , this point has an incidence with the line ℓ a,b . Further note that whenever (a, b) is different or x 3 is different, the incidence is also different. Thus by the above inequality the number of incidences between the set of points M and the set of lines L is at least
On the other hand, since L has size 2 2k and M has size 2 (1+α/2)2k ≤ 2 (1+α/2)2(1/2−δ) log p < 2 (1+α/2) log p ≤ p 2−β , by Theorem 3.10, the number of incidences between M and L is at most O(2 (3/2−α)(2+α)k ) < 2 3k(1−α/6) = 2 −αk/2 2 3k .
Thus we must have ǫ < 2 −αk/2 .
By choosing δ appropriately and noting that k ≥ (1/2 − δ) log p − 2, the lemma is proved.
Now we can use the non-uniform XOR lemma to argue that our extractor is non-malleable. Specifically, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Let δ be the constant in Lemma 5.4. Given any (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2 − δ)n, and Y an independent source over {0, 1} n with min-entropy (1 − δ)n, let W = IP(Enc(X), Enc(Y )) and W ′ = IP(Enc(X), Enc(Y ′ )) where Y ′ = A(Y ) and ∀y ∈ {0, 1} n , A(y) = y. For any two characters ψ(s) = e 2πits/p and ψ ′ (s) = e 2πit ′ s/p where t, t ′ ∈ F p and t = 0,
Proof. Note that W, W ′ are deterministic functions of X, Y . Thus
Depending on whether ψ ′ is trivial, we have two cases. Case 1: t ′ = 0. This corresponds to the case where ψ ′ is the trivial character. In this case ψ ′ (W ′ ) is always 1. Thus
Note that Enc(Y ) has the same min-entropy as Y , which is (1 − δ)n. Now consider Enc(X). Since X has min-entropy (1/2 − δ)n, by Lemma 5.4 3Enc(X) is p −Ω(1) -close to having min-entropy (1/2 + δ) log(p 2 ). Now note that the min-entropy of 4Enc(X) − 4Enc(X) is at least the min-entropy of 4Enc(X), and which in turn is at least the min-entropy of 3Enc(X). Thus 4Enc(X) − 4Enc(X) is p −Ω(1) -close to having min-entropy (1/2 + δ) log(p 2 ). Since (1/2 + δ) log(p 2 ) + (1 − δ)n > (1 + 2δ) log p + (1 − δ)(log p − 1) > (2 + δ) log p − 1, by Lemma 3.9 we have
Case 2: t ′ = 0. This corresponds to the case where ψ ′ is non-trivial. In this case, note that
where r = t ′ /t ∈ F p and r = 0 since t = 0 and t ′ = 0.
Now again by the same argument as above we have that 4Enc(X) − 4Enc(X) is p −Ω(1) -close to having min-entropy (1/2 + δ) log(p 2 ). Now we only need to bound the min-entropy of Enc(Y ).
If for every two different y 1 , y 2 , we have that Enc(y 1 ) + rEnc(y ′ 1 ) = Enc(y 2 ) + rEnc(y ′ 2 ), then obviously Enc(Y ) will have the same min-entropy as Y . Now assume that for some two different y 1 , y 2 , we have Enc(y 1 ) + rEnc(y ′ 1 ) = Enc(y 2 ) + rEnc(y ′ 2 ). This gives us
Hence we get
Since y 1 = y 2 and r = 0, we must have that y ′ 1 = y ′ 2 . Thus we get Note that r = −1 since otherwise this would imply that y ′ 1 = y 1 which contradicts the assumption that ∀y, A(y) = y. Thus we get y 2 = y 3 , another contradiction.
Therefore the min-entropy of
Now we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.7. Let δ be the constant from Lemma 5.4. Given any (n, k) source X with k = (1/2 − δ)n and an independent uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1} n , as well as any deterministic function A : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n such that ∀y, A(y) = y,
where ǫ = 2 −Ω(n) and output size m = Ω(n).
Proof. Let Z = nmExt(X, Y ) and Z ′ = nmExt(X, A(Y )). By Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 3.4, we can choose an m = Ω(n) and M = 2 m such that when nmExt(X, Y ) = IP(Enc(X), Enc(Y )) mod M and Y is an (n, (1 − δ)n) source independent of X, we have
Therefore when Y is an independent uniform distribution over {0, 1} n , by Theorem 3.6 we have
Thus we can take m = Ω(n) and ǫ = 2 2m (2 1−δn + ǫ ′ ) = 2 −Ω(n) . Thus the theorem is proved.
Achieving Even Smaller Min-Entropy
In this section we show that we can construct non-malleable extractors for even smaller min-entropy rate (potentially any constant arbitrarily close to 0), if we assume that we have affine extractors with large enough output size, and the Approximate Duality Conjecture (or the Polynomial FreimanRuzsa Conjecture) as in [BSZ11] .
Recall the definition of an affine extractor.
Definition 6.1. An [n, m, ρ, ǫ] affine extractor is a deterministic function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m such that whenever X is the uniform distribution over some affine subspace over F n 2 with dimension ρn, we have that for every z ∈ {0, 1} m ,
We now have the following construction.
Construction 6.2. Given any (n, k) source X and a constant 0 < λ < 1, let f :
Then there exists z ∈ {0, 1} m ′ such that |f −1 (z)| ≥ 2 n . Let F : {0, 1} n → f −1 (z) be (any) injective map. Now take a BCH code as in Theorem 3.11 with t = 2 and m = n ′ /2, and the n ′ × (2 n ′ /2 − 1) parity check matrix.
Take an independent uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1} n ′ /2−1 and let S Y stand for the integer whose binary expression is Y . We encode Y toȲ such thatȲ = Enc(Y ) is the S Y 'th column in the parity check matrix (i.e.,Ȳ = (Y, Y 3 ) when Y is viewed as an element in F * 2 n ′ /2 ). Our non-malleable extractor is now defined as
where IP is the inner product function taken over F 2 .
Remark 6.3. Note that here the function F may not be efficiently computable (in time poly(n)). However, the time to compute F is polynomial in the length of the truth table of our final extractor. Lemma 6.4. For any (n, k) source X with k = 2.5λ 1+2λ n and an independent (
Proof. As usual we can assume without loss of generality that X and Y are flat sources. If nmExt(X, Y ) = IP(F (X), Enc(Y )) is a constant, then Supp(F (X)) and Supp(Enc(Y )) must be contained in two affine subspaces with dimension
is an injective function. Thus Supp(Enc(Y )) has size 2 n ′ 3
3 n ′ and thus reach a contradiction. To see this, let S = Supp(F (X)). It suffices to show that S is not contained in any affine subspace of dimension 2 3 n ′ . Let A be such an affine subspace. We have
where the last inequality follows from the fact that f is an affine extractor. Now note that |S| = 2 2.5λ 1+2λ n = 2 2.5λ 3 n ′ . Thus we have that |A ∩ S| < |S| and therefore S cannot be contained in A.
Recall the Approximate Duality conjecture introduced in [BSZ11] .
Conjecture 6.5. (Approximate Duality (ADC)) [BSZ11] For every pair of constants α, δ > 0 there exist a constant ζ > 0 and an integer r, both depending on α and δ such that the following holds for sufficiently large n. If A, B ⊆ F n 2 satisfy |A|, |B| ≥ 2 αn and µ ⊥ (A, B) ≥ 2 −ζn , then there exists a pair of subsets
Now we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6.6. There exists a constant ζ = ζ(λ) such that for any (n, k) source X with k = 3λ 1+2λ n and an independent ( +1 . Thus if we let X ′ and Y ′ be the uniform distribution over A ′′ and B ′′ respectively, we get two independent sources that satisfy the conditions in Lemma 6.4. However IP(F (X ′ ), Enc(Y ′ )) is a constant, which contradicts Lemma 6.4. Thus we must have that nmExt(X, Y ) is 2 −ζn -close to uniform. Now we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.7. There exists a constant ζ = ζ(λ) such that for any (n, k) source X with k = 3λ 1+2λ n and an independent uniform seed Y over
Reducing the Seed Length and Increasing the Output Size
In this section we show that we can reduce the seed length and increase the output size for the constructions in Section 4, Subsection 5.1 and Section 6. All these constructions share the same pattern: the seed Y is encoded using the parity check matrix of a BCH code, and then the output is the inner product function of the encoded source and the encoded seed over F 2 . We only discuss the construction in Subsection 5.1, and the method used can be applied to all the other constructions in the same way. We start by showing how to reduce the seed length.
Reducing the seed length
In the constructions mentioned above, we use a BCH code with distance 5. Thus the columns of the parity check matrix are 4-wise linearly independent. To reduce the seed length, we are going to use a BCH code with larger distance. Specifically, we will choose a [2 ℓ − 1, 2 ℓ − 1 − 2tℓ, 4t + 1]-BCH code with ℓ = p/t for some parameter t to be chosen later. Note that the parity check matrix is a 2p × (2 ℓ − 1) matrix 4 . Thus the columns of the matrix are D = 4t-wise linearly independent. The detailed construction is as follows.
• Given an (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2 − δ)n, pick a prime p such that n ≤ p ≤ n(1 + 1 2 ln 2 n ).
• Let q = 2 p and g be a generator in F * q . Treat X as an element in F * q and encode X such that Enc(X) = (X, g X ).
• Let ℓ = p/t. Take the parity check matrix of a [2 ℓ − 1, 2 ℓ − 1 − 2tℓ, 4t + 1]-BCH code. Note that it is a 2p × (2 ℓ − 1) matrix. Take an independent and uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1} ℓ−1 and let S Y stand for the integer whose binary expression is Y . We encode Y toȲ such thatȲ is the S Y 'th column in the parity check matrix.
• Output nmExt(X, Y ) = IP(Enc(X),Ȳ ) where IP is the inner product function taken over F 2 .
As in Subsection 5.1, we have Claim 5.2. We now want to argue about the min-entropy of tȲ and t(Ȳ +Ā(Y )).
Lemma 7.1. Assume Y has min-entropy k 2 , then tȲ is t 2 2 −(k 2 +1) -close to having min-entropy t(k 2 − log t), and t(Ȳ +Ȳ ′ ) is t 2 2 −(k 2 +2) + t(t2
k 2 ) log t -close to having min-entropy t((1 − log t 3t )k 2 − 3 log t).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that Y is a flat source. Let K = 2 k 2 . First consider tȲ . Note thatȲ has the same min-entropy as Y and is also a flat source, since every two columns of the parity check matrix are different. The support of tȲ has the formȳ 1 + · · · +ȳ t . Consider the case where allȳ i 's are different. This takes up a probability mass of
Since the columns of the parity check matrix are 4t-wise linearly independent. For every two different sets {ȳ i }'s, their sum cannot be the same. Therefore, the probability mass of getting a particular value is at most t!K −t ≤ 2 −t(k 2 −log t) . Thus tȲ is t 2 2 −(k 2 +1) -close to having min-entropy t(k 2 − log t).
Next consider t(Ȳ +Ā(Y )). Let A(Y ) = Y ′ and Y ′′ =Ȳ +Ȳ ′ . Note that for every s ∈ Supp(Y ′′ ), s = 0 since ∀y, A(y) = y. Also note that Y ′′ has min-entropy at least k 2 −1 since ifȳ 1 +ȳ ′ 1 =ȳ 2 +ȳ ′ 2 for y 1 = y 2 , then we must haveȳ ′ 1 =ȳ 2 andȳ ′ 2 =ȳ 1 . Without loss of generality assume that Y ′′ is a flat source with min-entropy k 2 − 1. Let K 2 = 2 k 2 −1 . Note that now in the support of Y ′′ there are no two different y 1 , y 2 such thatȳ 1 +ȳ ′ 1 =ȳ 2 +ȳ ′ 2 (since this will be absorbed into the same element).
We now consider tY ′′ . An element in its support has the form t i=1 (ȳ i +ȳ ′ i ). We first get rid of those elements in Supp(tY ′′ ) such that some of the {ȳ i +ȳ ′ i }'s are the same. By the same argument as above this takes up a probability mass of at most
. Now, for a particular set {ȳ i +ȳ ′ i } i∈[t] , we consider how many different sets can have the same sum.
Since the columns of the parity check matrix are 4t-wise linearly independent, if the sum of two different sets {ȳ i +ȳ ′ i } i∈ [t] are the same, then except thoseȳ i +ȳ ′ i 's that are common in both sets, the rest ofȳ i +ȳ ′ i 's must form cycles. By cycle we mean a set of l elements such that y ′ 1 =ȳ 2 ,ȳ ′ 2 =ȳ 3 , · · · ,ȳ ′ l =ȳ 1 so that the sum is 0. Note that l ≥ 3 since the support of Y ′′ has no 2-cycles. Let S 1 , S 2 be the two sets {ȳ i +ȳ ′ i } i∈ [t] . Now, the elements in a cycle can come from both sets or just from one set. If the elements from a cycle comes only from S 2 , then this cycle can be replaced by any other cycle with the same length, and the sum of S 1 and S 2 are still the same. On the other hand, if the elements of a cycle comes from both S 1 and S 2 , then the elements in this cycle are completely determined by S 1 since cycles are disjoint. Therefore, let r be the number of common elements in S 1 , S 2 , and let l be the total length of cycles whose elements only come from the rest elements of S 2 , and note that cycles have length at least 3, we have that if l ≥ log t, then the total probability mass of these elements in Supp(tY ′′ ) is at most
On the other hand, if l < log t, then the probability that tY ′′ gets a particular value is at most
Thus the min-entropy is at least t((1 − log t 3t )k 2 − 3 log t).
Now for an (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2−δ)n, we know that 3Enc(X) is 2 −Ω(n) -close to having min-entropy (1/2+δ)(2p). Assume that we want our non-malleable extractor to have error ǫ ≤ 1/n. We'll choose a parameter t < n/C log n for a sufficiently large constant C > 1. When Y is uniform over ℓ = p/t bits, tȲ is close to having min-entropy t(k 2 −log t) > (1−1/C)p > (1/2−δ/2)(2p), and t(Ȳ +Ȳ ′ ) is close to having min-entropy t((1− log t 3t )k 2 −3 log t) > (1−1/C)p > (1/2−δ/2)(2p). When tȲ and t(Ȳ +Ȳ ′ ) indeed have this min-entropy, by Lemma 3.8 we have that both IP(3Enc(X), tȲ ) and IP(3Enc(X), t(Ȳ +Ȳ ′ )) are 2 −Ω(n) -close to uniform. Thus we can take t = Ω(n/(log(1/ǫ))) and by Lemma 3.9 and Theorem 3.6 we have that the error of the non-malleable extractor is at most ǫ, and the seed length is roughly p/t = O(n/t) = O(log(1/ǫ)). Thus we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2. There exists a universal constant δ > 0 such that for every n ∈ N and ǫ such that 2 −Ω(n) ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/poly(n), there exists an explicit (k, ǫ) non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} for k = (1/2 − δ)n and seed length d = O(log n + log(1/ǫ)).
Increasing the output size
Here we show that we can modify all the constructions with 1 bit output to output m = Ω(n) bits. Again we only discuss the construction in Subsection 5.1, and the method can be applied to all the other constructions with 1 bit output.
Recall that in the construction we used a field F 2 p for a prime p. Given the finite filed F 2 p , the elements of this field form a vector space of dimension p over Lemma 7.3. Given any (n, k)-source X with k = (1/2−δ)n and an independent seed Y ∈ {0, 1} p−1 with min-entropy (1 − δ)p, let A : {0, 1} p−1 → {0, 1} p−1 be any deterministic function such that ∀y, A(y) = y. For any i, let
Then for any non-empty subset S 1 ⊆ [p] and any subset S 2 ⊆ [p], we have that
Proof. Note that i∈S 1
where t 1 = i∈S 1 b i ∈ F 2 p , and Now by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.1, X ′ is 2 −Ω(n) -close to a source with min-entropy (1/2 + δ)(2p). Thus we only need to bound the min-entropy ofỸ . We have two cases.
Case 1: S 2 = φ. In this caseỸ = t 1 (Y, Y 3 ). Since S 1 = φ, we have t 1 = 0. ThusỸ has the same min-entropy as Y , which is (1 − δ)p. Since (1/2 + δ)(2p) + (1 − δ)p = (2 + δ)p, by Lemma 3.8 we have that
Therefore |E X,Y [ψ(IP(Enc(X),Ỹ ))]| ≤ 2 −Ω(n) . Case 2: S 2 = φ. In this case we have t 1 = 0 and t 2 = 0. We need to bound the min-entropy of Y = t 1 (Y, Y 3 ) + t 2 (Y ′ , Y ′3 ). Again, if for every two different y 1 , y 2 , we have t 1 (y 1 , y 3 1 ) + t 2 (y ′ 1 , y ′3 1 ) = t 1 (y 2 , y 3 2 ) + t 2 (y ′ 2 , y ′3 2 ), thenỸ will have the same min-entropy of Y . We now have the following claim.
Claim 7.4. Any element in Supp(Ỹ ) can come from at most 3 different elements in Supp(Y ).
Proof of the claim. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there are 4 different y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 such that t 1 (y i , y 3 i ) + t 2 (y ′ i , y ′3 i ) are the same for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. First consider y 1 , y 2 , we have t 1 (y 1 , y 3 1 ) + t 2 (y ′ 1 , y ′3 1 ) = t 1 (y 2 , y 3 2 ) + t 2 (y ′ 2 , y ′3 2 ). Since t 1 = 0, let r = t 2 /t 1 F 2 p . Thus r = 0 and we have (y 1 , y 3 1 ) + r(y ′ 1 , y ′3 1 ) = (y 2 , y 3 2 ) + r(y ′ 2 , y ′3 2 ). We first consider the case where r = 1. In this case, the vectors (y 1 , y 3 1 ), (y ′ 1 , y ′3 1 ), (y 2 , y 3 2 ) and (y ′ 2 , y ′3 2 ) are linearly dependent over F 2 . However we know that the columns of the parity check matrix of the BCH code are 4-wise linearly independent. Thus we must have y ′ 1 = y 2 and y ′ 2 = y 1 . Thus in this case the element in Supp(Ỹ ) comes from at most 2 different elements in Supp(Y ). Now if r = 1, we have Since r = 1, r 2 − 1 = 0. Thus we have y 3 = y 4 , a contradiction.
Therefore, the min-entropy ofỸ is at least H ∞ (Y ) − log 3 = (1 − δ)p − log 3. Now by Lemma 3.8 we have that |E X ′ ,Y [ψ(X ′ ·Ỹ )]| ≤ 2 2p 2 −(1+2δ)p 2 −(1−δ)p+log 3 + 2 −Ω(n) = 2 −Ω(n) .
Therefore |E X,Y [ψ(IP(Enc(X),Ỹ ))]| ≤ 2 −Ω(n) .
Now if we have a uniform random seed Y ∈ {0, 1} p−1 , by Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.6 we can choose m = Ω(n) bits from {Z i } such that when we output Z 1 • · · · • Z m we get a non-malleable extractor with error 2 −Ω(n) and output size m = Ω(n). Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.5. There exists a constant 0 < δ < 1 such that for any n ∈ N, k = (1/2 − δ)n, there exists an explicit (k, ǫ)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m with m = Ω(n) and ǫ = 2 −Ω(n) .
Conclusions and Open Problems
In this paper we give the first explicit constructions of non-malleable extractors for min-entropy k < n/2. We give two unconditional constructions for k = (1/2 − δ)n for some constant δ > 0 and one conditional construction that can potentially achieve any constant min-entropy rate. Using our non-malleable extractor, we also obtain the first optimal privacy amplification protocol for k = (1/2 − δ)n, with an active adversary.
There are several natural open problems left. First, two of our constructions achieve an optimal seed length, but only output 1 bit. It will be interesting to see if we can output more than 1 bit in these cases. Second, the constructions that can output multiple bits have a large seed length d = n. It is natural to ask if we can reduce the seed length in these cases. Also, one obvious open problem is to construct non-malleable extractors for smaller min-entropy, or to obtain an unconditional construction for any constant min-entropy rate.
Finally, we want to point out that all known constructions of non-malleable extractors, including [DLWZ11, CRS11] and our constructions, seem to be some variant of known constructions of twosource extractors. This seems to suggest that there is some connection between non-malleable extractors and two-source extractors. We feel that this is interesting. It would be very nice if such a connection can be established, and thus help us gain knowledge and insights about both non-malleable extractors and two-source extractors.
